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Abstract
In this paper we provide an empirical analysis of the performance of micronance
groups, known as Self-Help groups, based on an original census we carried out in a poor
area of Northern India. We examine whether traditionally disadvantaged villagers, such
as members of lower castes or landless farmers, are less likely to have access to groups.
We also analyze their performance in terms of access to bank loans, which is an important
benet of the groups. We nd evidence of the attrition process being selective against
lower castes: they have a lower probability of becoming a permanent member of a group.
The net eects in terms of their expected access to a bank loan remain however relatively
limited. By contrast, even though landless farmers are more likely to fail or leave the
groups, they tend to benet disproportionately. In expected terms, they receive more
than two times the amounts of bank loans given to farmers owning more than one acre.
Overall, the program therefore has positive and important distributional implications.
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Micronance is often advocated as a solution to multiple social problems. Poor households
with access to credit can make investments that bring them out of poverty, household and
regional income and wealth disparities are reduced, and group meetings provide forums for
collective action that improve gender relations and local governance. Over the last few years,
savings and credit groups have also helped in managing some important social programs of the
Indian government, such as the distribution of food grains and school meals in state primary
schools.
The number of organizations involved in the micronance sector is very large and organiza-
tional forms vary considerably. Most loans involve some form of group lending with members
sharing responsibility for repayment. It is useful to distinguish between two principal institu-
tional forms through which lending takes place. In the rst, micronance institutions organize
potential lenders into groups. Group composition may be determined by random factors, as
in the case of FINCA in Peru, or the matching preferences of members as in the Grameen
Bank model.1 In all these cases, micronance institutions are intimately involved in all stages
of the group lending process: group formation, rules that govern member interactions, and
the provision of credit. Bank representatives are often present at group meetings.
An alternative setting is one in which group interactions, group loans and the institu-
tions involved with group formation are much more loosely connected. Government and
non-government agencies are involved in the formation of groups, which determine their own
rules for savings and lending. Some of these groups subsequently borrow from commercial
banks. This is the dominant model in Indian micronance, in terms of both outreach and
total loan disbursements. The present structure of the micronance sector in India emerged
in the early nineties when the Reserve Bank of India issued guidelines to all nationalized
commercial banks encouraging them to lend to informal groups which came to be called Self-
Help Groups (SHGs). Since then, such groups have been actively promoted by a number of
dierent agencies and the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD)
has provided banks with subsidized credit for SHG lending.2 Government statistics currently
report over 6,9 million groups and 97 millions households covered by the program (NABARD,
2011).
This paper reports ndings from a study of 1,679 SHGs with a total of 26,971 women
1See Karlan (2006) for a description of group operations in FINCA and Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch
(2005), chapter 4 for details on Grameen Bank group lending practices.
2See Reserve Bank of India (1991) and NABARD (1992) for the original policy statements.
1members in selected regions of rural Northern India. The groups were formed during the
period 1992-2007 by PRADAN, a non-government organization working in these areas. Entry
into the groups is voluntary. The extent of the coverage oered by the program is impressive,
as about 42% of the households in the villages we surveyed have a member participating in
an SHG. The performance of the groups and their members vary however. Thus, we nd that
12% of all groups created over this period are no longer active and that 12% of members left
groups while it was still functioning. Some women who leave groups join other SHGs. Taking
them into account, we nd that about 17% of the members who joined a group had left the
SHG network. Groups also dier in their access to bank loans, the major motive behind their
creation. Thus, about 30% of the groups and of the members do not have a bank loan.
We are interested in the factors underlying these measures of performance. In particular,
we shall focus on two groups of villagers that are traditionally at a disadvantage in terms of
village life and economic activities. The rst of these consists in the lower caste groups, the
scheduled tribes and the scheduled castes, who lie at the bottom of the social hierarchy. The
second disadvantaged group we focus on concerns the landless households. Given that these
villages are still predominantly rural, landlessness remains a critical determinant of poverty
and economic exclusion. We examine to what extent, being of a lower caste group or being
landless, matters for participating actively to these groups and drawing benets from them.
In terms of participation into the groups, we nd some evidence of scheduled tribes being
less likely to have access, but this is mainly due to a bias in the placement of the program, as
fewer groups are created in tribal dominated villages. Groups composed of scheduled tribes
and scheduled castes members are less likely to survive and obtain bank loans unless they also
include members of higher castes. However, these socially mixed groups also display larger
departure rates by lower castes members. By contrast, landless villagers are much more likely
to participate to groups than other villagers, and even though they also tend to fail and leave
more often, they still remain over-represented in the surviving groups. Within groups, we nd
no dierences in terms of access to bank loans.
These results suggest that, even though the attrition process is selective against weaker
segments of the population, these processes ultimately do not lead to large dierences in terms
of participation and access to loans against lower castes members. Moreover, the overall impact
of these groups is, if anything, biased in favor of landless farmers. As a whole, these programs
are, on average, rather progressive in terms of their distributional implications.
We provide a brief institutional history of the micronance sector in India and a description
of our survey data in Section 2. In Section 3, we analyze the composition of the groups in terms
of castes and landownership. Section 4 analyzes the process of survival of groups and members,
2using duration models. Section 5 analyzes the determinants of their nancial performance in
terms of access to bank loans. A brief section concludes.
2 Micronance in India and our survey data
2.1 Micronance institutions in India
Many detailed accounts on the characteristics of rural credit markets in India and the spread
of rural banking in the post independence period are available. A number of studies, starting
with the All India Rural Credit Survey in 1954, found that the rural poor had high levels of
indebtedness and very limited bank access.3 As part of a process of providing banking services
to this population, the State Bank of India was set up in 1955, the 14 largest commercial banks
were nationalized in 1969, and the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development
(NABARD) was created in 1982. Each of the nationalized banks were assigned the role of
lead banks in particular parts of the country and they were required to maintain specic ratios
of urban to rural branches. A vast network comprising thousands of cooperative banks and
regional rural banks was created primarily to provide credit to the agricultural sector. These
eorts created a vast system for credit delivery with high default rates and operating costs.4
In the early nineties central bankers tried to revitalize the elaborate and largely inecient
banking system through which rural credit came to be provided after Indian Independence.
The start of institutionalized micronance in India is often attributed to the circular that
was issued by the Reserve Bank to all nationalized commercial banks in 1991, announcing the
objective of linking informal groups of rural poor with the existing banking system. Some
non-government organizations at the time had organized women into informal groups that
used their pooled savings for mutual insurance and small credit needs. Based on studies of
these informal groups, it was believed that they had the \potential to bring together the formal
banking structure and the rural poor for mutual benet" (Reserve Bank of India, 1991). The
following year NABARD launched a pilot project which linked 500 groups with commercial
banks. The banks were oered nance from NABARD for such lending at the rate of 6.5% per
annum. It was recommended that banks either lend directly to groups at 11.5% per annum
3See for example, Bell (1990) for summary statistics on rural borrowing and indebtedness based on rural
credit surveys and Karmakar (1999) for recent gures on the numbers of dierent types of rural banking
institutions.
4The extent to which this system reached the poor is unclear, but there is evidence that they inuenced
regional poverty rates (Burgess and Pande, 2005).
3or route their loans through voluntary agencies at the lower rate of 8.5% in order to cover
the transaction costs of these organizations (NABARD, 1992). Banks were also permitted to
classify such lending under Advances to Weaker Sections, and this category formerly accounted
for a large fraction of their unprotable loans.
Another major change came in April 1999, with the launching of the Swarnajayanti Gram
Swarozgar Yojana, popularly known as the SGSY (Reserve Bank of India, 1999). The program
was introduced to increase the penetration of SHGs among families below the poverty line.
This reected a signicant change in state policy: It provided direct subsidies to borrowers
as only part of the initial loan had to be repaid. It also restricted the composition of a group
to families below the poverty line. Subject to caps, rates of subsidy were 50% for borrowers
from the scheduled castes and tribes and 30% for other poor households. A proper evaluation
of the changes that the SGSY brought about in the composition and performance of SHGs is
yet to be undertaken.5
The NABARD pilot program of 1992 was widely regarded as successful and the number of
SHGs linked to the banking system has been rising rapidly over the last 19 years. The total
number of groups linked in 2010 was reported to be over 4.9 million. There is considerable
variance in the distribution of SHGs across states and an overwhelming fraction is in the 4
southern states. Alternative models of lending have been growing in the last few years and
private banks have also entered the sector. The combined coverage of institutions in this
class remains small relative to SHG lending. This contrasts sharply with countries such as
Bangladesh and Indonesia, where each of the major specialized micronance institutions is
larger than the combined non-SHG sector in India. (Reserve Bank of India, 2005 (chapter 2)
and Basu, 2005).
It appears that the institutions that came to dominate the Indian micronance sector
resulted from the combined presence of a vibrant non-government sector engaged in rural
development and an extensive but unprotable network of rural banks and agricultural co-
operatives that were created with the explicit purpose of providing small loans to the rural
poor.6 Policy makers could observe the phenomenal expansions in outreach of micronance
5Our own surveys indicate that the combination of restrictions of group composition and subsidies may
have been a factor causing the dissolution of some groups. Surveyed groups were asked about whether or not
they received a subsidy. Although very few of the subsidized groups failed, other groups sometimes cited their
exclusion from state subsidies as a reason for group dissolution. In some cases, a few members were excluded
from the group by the others because they were not on government poverty lists.
6Harper (2002) provides some additional reasons for why SHGs rather than Grameen type institutions are
more successful in the Indian context.
4institutions like the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh and other countries. The Grameen Bank
alone, starting from humble beginnings had reached almost a quarter of all Bangladeshi vil-
lages by 1991.7 The linking of banks with SHGs seemed a natural step to take and it gave
India its own particular brand of micronance.
2.2 The PRADAN SHG program
Our data is based on surveys of SHGs created by PRADAN (Professional Assistance for
Development Action), one of the earliest NGOs in the Indian micronance sector. The NGO
is active in 44 districts, spread over 8 states. It aims to promote and strengthen the livelihoods
of socio-economically disadvantaged communities.
The SHG program operates by rst targeting administrative blocks with high levels of
rural poverty within particular districts. The groups themselves consist entirely of women
and follow the guidelines issued by NABARD and the Reserve Bank of India. PRADAN
professionals begin the process of group formation by calling a meeting in some public space
in the village. They discuss the benets of membership and some general principles followed by
successful groups (compulsory attendance, weekly savings, typical interest rates, bookkeeping).
Interested women are enlisted, a regular meeting time is set and the professional is usually
present at meetings until membership becomes fairly stable and all members are familiar with
group practices. Each group is provided with a register for keeping accounts and a cash
box, and either designates one of the members to keep accounts or hires an accountant. The
register, cash box and keys are usually rotated across the members. Smoothly functioning
groups typically open a savings account with a nearby commercial bank within a year of their
inception. After this stage, PRADAN professionals discuss possible self-employment projects
with the group, some members decide on particular projects and the group then applies to a
commercial bank for a loan. This loan constitutes their rst bank linkage. Bank funds usually
come into the group which then lends to individual members at interest rates determined by
the group. Payments are made to the group which then repays the bank on the stipulated
date.
As the group gains condence and shows that it can manage its functioning independently,
PRADAN professionals withdraw and their direct interactions with group members increas-
ingly take place on occasions when they visit the village to initiate other livelihood projects.
As a result of the growing independence of these groups over time, the organizations promoting
7Figures for the total number of villages are from the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (www.bbs.gov.bd)
and those for the number covered by the Grameen Bank are available at www.grameen-info.org.
5SHGs are not always informed about groups that are no longer active. Survey data is therefore
required to correctly estimate rates of group survival and to study group performance.
2.3 The survey
We ran a census of all the 1,679 SHGs created by PRADAN in ve of its eld locations, two in
northern Orissa, one in central Chhattisgarh and two in northern Jharkhand. The eld teams
are close, but not contiguous, as can be seen from Figure 7 in the appendix. Running a census
was particularly appropriate as we focus on groups' disappearance and members' departure,
which a traditional random survey is more likely to miss. The observations therefore included
every group that has been formed since the start of the program in these areas. In addition to
group level data, we collected information on the backgrounds and SHG activities of 26,971
women who, at any stage, had been members of these groups.
Table 1 overviews the number of SHGs and members in the data set, divided by state,
district and survey period.8
Table 1: Overview data set
State District Number of SHGs Number of Members Survey Period
Orissa Mayurbhanj and Keonjhar 532 8,599 May - June 2006
Chhattisgarh Raigarh 570 8,312 January - February 2007
Jharkhand Koderma and Hazaribagh 577 10,060 March - April 2008
8We miss some observations because of three reasons: (1) In the Hazaribagh district, a small number of
inactive groups refused to sit with the research team. We asked them a minimal number of questions at the
group level, but did not receive any member level information. Therefore, we had to drop the 17 villages (out
of 95) in which these SHGs are located. We retain information on 1,637 groups and their 26,817 members.
(2) We do not have the village level information for 5 SHGs and their 88 members. (3) A rst analysis of
the Orissa and Chhattisgarh data revealed that some important information, like the allocation of bank loans
within the group, was missing. Hence, before moving to the nal state, the Orissa (September - October 2007)
and Chhattisgarh (November - December 2007) SHGs have been revisited with a complementary questionnaire.
Due to problems with a private rm in Orissa, it was not possible to re-survey 63 groups. In Chhattisgarh one
SHG is not revisited. The complementary questions are available for all SHGs in Jharkhand. This reduces
our dataset in Section 5, where we study the group performance.
63 Group composition
3.1 Group composition at the village level
We rst examine the composition of the groups, focusing on the caste status of their members.
The caste status we consider here is dened by the four main categories of castes: scheduled
tribes (ST), schedules castes (SC), other backward castes (OBC) and forward castes (FC).9
These categories are hierarchically organized, with the ST and SC at the bottom and the FC
at the top of the social ladder.
The caste composition of the villages and the groups surveyed is given in Table 2. The rst
two columns report the average caste composition of villagers and group members across all
villages. As villages vary in terms of population as well as in terms of the number of groups they
have, we also report in the last two columns the composition across individuals. To investigate
whether, at the time of their creation, particular castes are less likely to participate, we report
here the composition of the group at the time of its creation and thereby ignore those members
who left or who joined the group after its creation. We return to this issue later.
Table 2: Caste composition of the villages and the groups
Average across all villages Across individuals
Share of population Share of population Share of households Share of members
in the villages (%) in the groups (%) in the villages (%) in the groups (%)
Scheduled tribes 42.3 41.3 37.6 33.6
(34.9) (37.8)
Scheduled castes 15.3 17.3 16.3 19.0
(18.4) (24.9)
Other backward castes 39.5 38.9 43.4 44.8
(29.0) (32.9)
Forward castes 2.9 2.5 2.7 2.6
(9.3) (8.9)
Observations (#) 404 404 59,497 24,057
Standard deviations are given in parentheses.
On average, the share of dierent castes in the group reects quite closely the distribution
of castes within the villages. Across the whole population however, scheduled tribes are under-
9As is well known, within each of these categories, there are a large number of dierent sub-castes and
tribes. Moreover, some mobility across categories has been observed in the past, whereby some tribes and
sub-castes succeeded in moving upwards in the social hierarchy (for more details, see, e.g., Somanathan, 2007
and Cassan, 2011).
7represented in the groups, while scheduled castes are over-represented. In particular, while
the scheduled tribes represent 37.6% of the total population, they represent only 33.6% of the
members in the groups. In Table 3, we report the share of caste categories in the villages and
the groups, conditional on having households belonging to the caste category in the village.
It appears that there exists a placement bias. SHGs tend to be created more in villages where
tribal households are less present, with an average participation rate (dened as the ratio
of average number of group members to the average number of households in those village)
between 38.2 and 39.7%. By contrast, the participation rate in villages in which scheduled
tribes exist is lower and equal to 35.8%. It should also be noted that, on average, scheduled
tribes tend to live in smaller villages (column 3).
Table 3: Share of caste categories in the villages and the groups, conditional on having house-
holds belonging to the caste category in the village
Average across all villages Across individuals
Share of Share of Number of Number of Share of Share of
population in population in households members households in members in
the villages (%) the groups (%) in village in village the villages (%) the groups (%)
Scheduled tribes 57.4 (28.0) 55.9 (33.4) 148 (155) 53 (46) 50.7 51.0
Observations (#) 298 298 298 298 44,249 15,860
Scheduled castes 20.0 (18.7) 22.4 (26.5) 171 (154) 67 (58) 18.4 22.0
Observations (#) 309 309 309 309 52,759 20,584
Other backward castes 43.3 (27.5) 42.5 (32.2) 156 (147) 62 (56) 45.0 47.2
Observations (#) 368 368 368 368 57,325 22,798
Forward castes 8.1 (14.1) 6.5 (13.8) 191 (194) 73 (68) 5.6 5.3
Observations (#) 147 147 147 147 28,041 10,773
Standard deviations are given in parentheses.
This being said, within the same village, the caste composition of the group is unbiased.
This is conrmed by the following regressions, where we regress the proportion of group mem-
bers belonging to a particular caste on its share in the village population. Given the constraint
that these proportions add to 100%, the equations cannot be estimated independently, and we
therefore use the Zellner seemingly unrelated regressions estimation technique. The results of
these regressions are given in Table 4.
In column (1), we report the regression results when one uses all the villages in our sample.
With the exception of the forward castes, the coecients for all the other groups are very close
to one, which indicates that, on average, the proportion of each caste in the groups is equal to
the share of that caste in the village. These results fully support the idea that, at the time of
8Table 4: Caste composition of the groups at the village level
Over all Villages with at least First group Second group Third group
villages 20% of two castes created created created
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable: Share of ST in group
Share of ST in village 0.9984*** 0.9961*** 1.0001*** 0.9985*** 0.9998***
(0.0037) (0.0084) (0.0063) (0.0063) (0.0029)
Dependent variable: Share of SC in group
Share of SC in village 1.0122*** 1.0221*** 1.0277*** 1.0196*** 1.0016***
(0.0095) (0.0156) (0.0164) (0.0164) (0.0070)
Dependent variable: Share of OBC in group
Share of OBC in village 0.9999*** 1.0005*** 0.9916*** 0.9986*** 1.0001***
(0.0047) (0.0097) (0.0081) (0.0075) (0.0033)
Dependent variable: Share of FC in group
Share of FC in village 0.9111*** 0.8685*** 0.8910*** 0.8756*** 0.9888***
(0.0176) (0.0226) (0.0291) (0.0295) (0.0126)
N 404 248 404 330 240
Standard errors are given in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
their creation, the caste composition of the groups, on average, is not biased and reects closely
the social composition of the villages. As we may be comparing villages that are homogenous
in terms of castes and therefore report an inter-village composition eect, we report in column
(2) the results obtained when we select only those villages where at least two castes represent
at least 20% of villagers. The results are strikingly similar. Finally, in the columns (3), (4)
and (5), we report the results obtained when we compare the caste composition of the rst,
second and third group created to the caste composition in the village. Indeed, in the creation
of the group, there might exist a particular pattern whereby the rst group selects the most
advanced caste-wise members of the village and rejects members of other castes who then
tend to be over-represented in the subsequent groups. We nd little evidence of this, as the
coecients obtained remain quite stable across the dierent categories. They are also very
robust across all the regressions.
9Another important source of bias may be related to wealth. Given that these villages are
all located in remote rural areas, where the major occupation is farming, we also looked at the
landownership status of group members. In particular, landless households are vulnerable, as
they mostly rely on casual labour as their main occupation.10 Unfortunately, the information
available to us at the village level is rather coarse, as landownership in the village surveys was
dened in terms of categories instead of actual land size. The rst two columns in Table 5
report the average land ownership composition of groups and villages across all villages, the
third and fourth column across individuals. The last column reports the coecients estimated
by regressing the fraction of group members of a particular land category to the fraction of
households in that category in the village, using again Zellner estimators.11
A very interesting pattern emerges from Table 5, as group composition tends to be biased
in favor of the households in the lowest land ownership category. In particular, landless house-
holds in a village are twice more likely to be a member of a group than wealthier households
who own at least one acre of land. As the regression indicates, group membership decreases
with landownership, so that poorer households are always more likely to be a member of a
group than richer households. This nding partly contrasts with the earlier nding by So-
manathan and Dewan (2004) based on a cross-sectional survey on some of the households
included in our sample. Using a wealth index, they nd that the bottom 5% of the village
population were less likely to be part of a group. It is possible that, in our sample, the very
poor incur more diculties in becoming members of a group. However, given that we do
not have detailed information on income, consumption expenditures or ownership of durable
goods, we cannot investigate this issue and replicate the non-parametric approach used there.12
The results given above do not control for households and village level variables that may
10Among landless households, only 5.8% declare themselves as farmers. Their main occupation is casual
labour (52.1%), housewives (29.5%) and traditional handicraft (7.0%). Only 2.6% of them have a permanent
salaried position. For non-landless households, the main occupations are farming (26.1%), casual labour
(29.1%), housewives (32.32%), traditional handicraft (7.0%) and permanent salaried position (2.3%). They
also seem to be more educated, as the correlation between landownership and education is positive and equal
to 0.125.
11As we did for the caste composition, we also ran separate regressions for villages where at least two land
categories each represent at least 20% of the village population, as well as by distinguishing between the rst,
second and third group created in the village. The results are very similar to the ones reported above and are
therefore omitted.
12It should be noted that Somanathan and Dewan (2004) nd that, on average, group members tend to be
poorer in terms of income or consumption expenditures, but own slightly more land than non-members. None
of these dierences were signicant, however.
10Table 5: Land ownership composition of the villages and the groups
Average across all villages Across individuals Zellner estimators
Share of Share of Share of Share of Dependent variable:
population in population in households in members in Share of a particular
villages (%) groups (%) villages (%) groups (%) land category in group
Landless 11.9 20.7 11.8 19.6 1.2328***
(15.4) (23.2) (0.0484)
0 < acre  1 39.4 43.1 40.5 48.2 1.0643***
(24.4) (27.3) (0.0241)
1 < acre  2 23.0 16.4 22.7 15.0 0.6579***
(15.5) (13.4) (0.0244)
> 2 acres 25.7 19.8 25.0 17.2 0.7344***
(21.5) (18.3) (0.0244)
Observations (#) 404 404 59,346 23,980 404
Standard deviations are given in parentheses. In the last column standard errors are given. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
inuence membership. A natural approach would have been to investigate group membership
as a function of household characteristics using village xed eects. Unfortunately, our data
do not allow us to do this, as we do not have the required information for the households in
the village that are not member of a group. At the village level, we only know the share of
households endowed with a particular characteristic (caste and land ownership category).
3.2 Group composition at the group level
We now examine the composition of the groups within villages, as most of the villages (81.7%)
surveyed exhibit more than one group, and some sorting process may take place between groups
within the same village. In order to explore this, we rst visualize in Figure 1 the relation
between the share of households of a particular caste in a village and in all the groups of that
village (404 observations).
Figure 1 replicates the results obtained in the previous section. Within a village, on av-
erage, there is no selection of members based on their caste. This result is obtained using
averages at the village level. In Figure 2, we now represent the same information, but mea-
suring on the vertical axis the percentage of members of a given caste that are members of a
11particular group. In other terms, we now use the information at the group level instead of at
the village level (1,632 observations).
Figure 1: Caste selection at the village level
Figure 2: Caste selection at the group level
The contrast between the two gures is particularly striking: there is a lot of heterogeneity
across groups within the same village, as indicated by the much larger dispersion of the
12observations around the straight line. Moreover, we observe a signicant number of groups
that are homogenous, as evidenced by the accumulation of points at the maximal value of 1.
This suggests that while on average groups are representative of the caste composition within
their community, group composition varies a lot within the same village.
We do the same exercise for land selection at the village level in Figure 3 and at the group
level in Figure 4. Figure 3 replicates the results obtained in the previous section. Within
a village, on average, landless households are more likely to be a member of a group than
wealthier households who own at least one acre of land. Again, there is a contrast between
the two gures: there is a lot of heterogeneity across groups within the same village and we
observe a signicant number of groups that consist mostly of landless members.
Figure 3: Land selection at the village level
To further illustrate the importance of sorting across groups based on caste identity and
landownership, we rst compare caste fragmentation within groups with the fragmentation
over all members in the village. The fragmentation index used is the usual one, and measures
the probability that two randomly drawn members of the same set (group or village) belong
to a dierent caste. For our measure to be meaningful, we restrict ourselves to villages where
more than one group has been created, which represent 1,558 groups in 330 villages. We also
compute the same measure for land ownership categories. The results are reported in Table
6.
13Figure 4: Land selection at the group level
In terms of castes, the fragmentation index over the village population is much larger than
among group members. SHGs are therefore much more homogenous in terms of their social
composition. The same phenomenon is also observed for land categories. These results are
robust to dierent alternatives, such as including the villages that have only one group, or
focusing on the rst groups created within the villages.
Table 6: Fragmentation of caste and land at the group and at the village level
Caste category Land ownership category
At village level At group level At village level At group level
Fragmentation Index 0.36 0.23 0.55 0.43
(0.21) (0.22) (0.16) (0.22)
Observations (#) 330 1,558 330 1,558
Standard deviations are given in parentheses.
To illustrate this further, we construct an index of dissimilarity which captures the average
dierences in terms of caste composition and landownership across groups within the same
village. This index is based on the dis-proportionality of dierent castes across groups, and
more precisely measures the dierence between the relative share of a particular caste and the
14relative shares of the other castes in all groups of the same village. We rst have to dene













where Pijv is the number of members of caste j in group i in village v, Pikv is the number of
members of caste k, with k 6= j, in group i in village v, Pjv =
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This measure can be interpreted as the percentage of group members of a particular caste that
have to be changed across groups so that their shares in each group within a village are the
same. The same measure is also constructed for land categories.
Across villages, one can then dene the caste-wise dissimilarity index, Dj, which is the








Dj therefore represents, on average across all villages, the proportion of members of a par-
ticular caste or land category who should change groups for their members to be uniformly
represented in all groups of the same village. Finally, across all groups, one can also dene
the aggregate dissimilarity index, which is dened as the weighted average of caste-wise or
land-wise dissimilarity index, with a similar interpretation. These measures, while relatively
unfamiliar to economists (for some exceptions and alternative measures, see Echenique and
Fryer, 2006; and Sethi and Somanathan, 2009), have been used extensively in social sciences,
for instance to measure the extent of racial segregation across neighborhoods in American
cities (see in particular Duncan and Duncan, 1955; Cortese et al., 1976; and the discussions
in Reardon and Firebaugh, 2002; and Alonso-Villar and Del R o, 2010).
Finally, we also computed a generalized Gini index of segregation, which is based on
the proportion of members of a particular caste or land category in each group existing in
one village. It can be interpreted in the usual way as the area below the Lorenz curve of
proportional representation of each caste or land category across groups in the village (see in
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Table 7 reports the dissimilarity index for each caste and land group as well as the gener-
alized Gini index and the generalized dissimilarity index across all groups.
15Table 7: Segregation indices of castes and land across groups
Caste category Land ownership category
Dissimilarity index scheduled tribes 0.54 Dissimilarity index landless 0.50
Dissimilarity index scheduled castes 0.64 Dissimilarity index 0 < acre  1 0.45
Dissimilarity index other backward castes 0.54 Dissimilarity index 1 < acre  2 0.41
Dissimilarity index forward castes 0.70 Dissimilarity index > 2 acres 0.47
Generalized dissimilarity 0.57 Generalized dissimilarity 0.44
(0.23) (0.16)
Generalized Gini index 0.64 Generalized Gini index 0.50
(0.24) (0.19)
Standard deviations are given in parentheses.
The measured indices are very large, which implies that a large proportion of members
should be exchanged across groups within the same village to achieve a proportional represen-
tation of each caste or land category in those groups: on average, about half of the members
should change groups within the village.13 This reects the fact that groups are much more
homogenous in terms of caste and landownership than the population of group members in a
village.
In Figure 5, we present the distribution of the aggregate dissimilarity across the villages.
The distribution of the dissimilarity index for the caste categories is concentrated between 0.4
and 0.9, which indicates a high degree of fragmentation across SHGs in almost all villages.
The distribution of the dissimilarity index for land is more concentrated around its mean.
4 Group and member duration
4.1 Descriptive statistics about group failure and member depar-
ture
In the preceding section, we have highlighted the fact that, within the same village, the
composition of SHGs varies a lot in terms of caste and landownership. Potential members
tend to sort themselves out, and are therefore more likely to belong to a group composed
13The gures obtained are very similar to those obtained for the indices relative to African-American resi-
dential or school segregation (see e.g. Cortese et al., 1976; and Sparks et al., 2010).
16Figure 5: The distribution of the caste-wide and land-wide aggregate index of dissimilarity
across the villages
of members of the same caste or landownership category. We also saw that membership in
groups, if anything, tends to be biased in favor of villagers with no or little landholding.
These observations naturally lead to the following questions. First, given that some groups
disappear, is the survival of the group related to its composition in terms of castes and landown-
ership? Second, are some members more likely to leave groups while others are more likely
to stay? In other words, is the process of disappearance of some groups and some members
selective? Third, to what extent the achievements of the groups, and of its members, are
related to the characteristics of the groups and its members in terms of caste, landownership
and other relevant characteristics? We focus on the two rst issues in this section and address
the third question in Section 5.
In the following, we describe a group as `inactive' if the group does not have any more
meetings at present and declares that they have no plans to meet in the future. A group is
considered as `active' if they held meetings at the time of the survey or intended to meet in the
future. A member is considered as `departed' if she abandoned a group which is still active,
or if she left an inactive group before the last meeting. A member is considered as `present'
17if she still participates in an active group or if she belonged to an inactive group up to its
last meeting day. We rst present some descriptive statistics on departure rates by caste and
landownership status in Table 8. For each individual of a particular caste or land category, we
compute the probability that she becomes a member of a group, that the group she belongs
to fails, that she leaves an existing group and, nally, that she enters a group and remains a
member of a group.
Table 8: Failure rates of groups and members by caste and landownership status
Probability Number of Probability Probability Probability of entering
of entering members of group of leaving and remaining in
a group failure the group an existing group
Scheduled tribes 41.1 9,278 10.5 14.6 30.9
Scheduled castes 52.3 5,069 10.1 13.4 40.0
Other backward castes 45.6 11,795 5.5 10.1 38.5
Forward castes 42.5 673 6.1 10.6 35.4
Landless 75.0 5,266 9.3 15.6 56.4
0 < acre  1 53.3 12,864 6.8 10.5 44.1
1 < acre  2 29.6 3,996 8.6 12.2 23.4
> 2 acres 31.0 4,600 9.6 12.5 24.1
Three interesting patterns emerge from these gures. First, as we already emphasized
before, while initial membership is slightly biased against scheduled tribes and in favor of
scheduled castes, it clearly favors villagers with little or no land. Second, group failures are
more frequent among scheduled tribes and scheduled castes compared to the other two caste
categories. Members of the scheduled tribes and scheduled castes are also much more likely
to leave groups. A similar pattern holds for landless members. The result of these processes
is that, compared to the other caste categories, the initial disadvantage of scheduled tribes
gets amplied by the failure rates both at the group and at the member levels. The initial
advantage of scheduled castes in terms of membership gets eroded by higher group failure and
departure rates, so that ultimately, their chances of remaining a member of an existing group
are similar to those of an other backward caste.
Third, in terms of land categories, entry into groups is very progressive, with landless
villagers about two times more likely to enter a group than other villagers. For instance,
compared to a small farmer owning less than one acre, they are 40% more likely to become a
18member of a group (and 2.5 times more likely than farmers owning more than one acre). They
however face higher failure rates, both in terms of group and members, so that their initial
advantage falls in the process. The probability that a landless farmer enters and remains a
member of an existing group falls from 75% to 56%, while that of a small farmer from 53% to
44%. As a whole, failures in terms of groups and members seem to aect disproportionately
scheduled tribes, scheduled castes and landless farmers.
In Table 9 we present caste-wise the departure rate for each landownership status. As we
do not have the distribution of land within each caste at the village level, we cannot compute
the probability an individual becomes a member of a group. We do present the probability
that the group she belongs to fails, that she leaves an existing group and, nally, that she
remains a member of a group, conditional on having entered one. The table shows that landless
villagers face higher failure rates within each caste. This process is mainly driven by members
leaving their group. Only for backward castes group failures are more frequent as compared
to members who own land.
We provide descriptive statistics on the group characteristics by survival status in Table
10 and on the characteristics of present and past members in Table 11.
A comparison of the two types of groups shows some interesting patterns. First, active and
currently inactive groups are both reasonably long-lived with inactive groups operating for an
average of three years after they are formed. Second, homogenous scheduled tribe groups
have a lower survival rate. The opposite holds for homogenous other backward caste groups.
Third, the groups with landless farmers are slightly more likely to fail. Finally, in terms of
their demographic characteristics, members of active groups are, on average, more educated
and more likely to have relatives in the group. There is no dierence in group size and in the
amount of land owned.14
Table 11 compares present and past members. Scheduled tribes, scheduled castes and
landless members are more likely to leave groups. The demographic characteristics of past
and present members are similar but they do dier in terms of their relationships within the
group: 45% of present members have another relative in the group, while this holds for only
30% of the past members.
Table 12 gives the characteristics of members by caste. Scheduled castes are most disad-
vantaged, both in terms of land holdings and education.
14Average member characteristics for both types of groups are calculated for the initial members of the
group.
19Table 9: Failure rates of groups and members by caste and landownership status combinations
Number of % of Probability Probability Probability of Signicance of the
members caste of group of leaving remaining in dierence relative to
failure the group existing group baseline category
Scheduled tribes: 9,244 100.0
Landless 1,661 18.0 10.5 17.5 72.1 N.A.
0 < acre  1 3,701 40.0 8.9 13.5 77.6 5.5*** (1.3)
1 < acre  2 1,748 18.9 12.0 14.5 73.6 1.5 (1.5)
> 2 acres 2,134 23.1 12.0 13.3 74.8 2.7* (1.4)
Scheduled castes 5,055 100.0
Landless 1,732 34.3 10.0 16.1 74.0 N.A.
0 < acre  1 2,614 51.7 10.5 10.3 79.2 5.2*** (1.3)
1 < acre  2 375 7.4 8.3 17.9 73.9 -0.1 (2.5)
> 2 acres 334 6.6 9.9 16.8 73.3 -0.7 (2.6)
Other backward castes 11,753 100.0
Landless 1,746 14.9 7.6 13.3 79.0 N.A.
0 < acre  1 6,231 53.0 4.2 8.8 86.9 7.9*** (1.0)
1 < acre  2 1,800 15.3 5.4 8.9 85.7 6.7*** (1.3)
> 2 acres 1,976 16.8 6.7 11.4 81.8 2.8** (1.3)
Forward castes 673 100.0
Landless 127 18.9 5.5 15.8 78.7 N.A.
0 < acre  1 318 47.3 3.1 10.4 86.5 7.8** (3.8)
1 < acre  2 72 10.7 5.6 9.7 84.7 6.0 (5.8)
> 2 acres 156 23.1 12.8 7.1 80.1 1.4 (4.8)
The asterisks indicate the statistical signicance of the dierence relative to the baseline category. * signicant at 10%; **
signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%
20Table 10: Group characteristics by survival status
Active Inactive All Dierence
Number of groups (%) 1,474 (90.0) 163 (10.0) 1,637 (100.0)
Average duration (years) 4.1 3.2 4.0 0.9***
(3.0) (2.8) (3.0) (0.2)
Homogeneous group (%) 38.3 43.6 38.8 -5.3
(48.6) (49.7) (48.7) (4.0)
ST (% of homogeneous) 38.5 54.9 40.3 -16.4***
(48.7) (50.1) (49.1) (6.2)
SC (% of homogeneous) 17.9 23.9 18.6 -6.0
(38.4) (43.0) (38.9) (4.9)
OBC (% of homogeneous) 42.7 18.4 40.0 24.3***
(49.5) (39.0) (49.0) (6.1)
FC (% of homogeneous) 0.9 2.8 1.1 -1.9
(9.4) (16.7) (10.4) (1.3)
Caste fragmentation 0.23 0.20 0.23 0.03
(0.22) (0.21) (0.22) (0.02)
Mean land (acres) 1.5 1.5 1.5 0.03
(2.0) (1.4) (1.9) (0.2)
Fraction of landless members 20.6 23.9 20.9 -3.3
(27.2) (29.0) (27.4) (2.3)
Mean education (years) 1.8 1.1 1.8 0.7***
(1.8) (1.3) (1.7) (0.1)
Average age 37.2 38.4 37.3 -1.2***
(5.6) (5.5) (5.6) (0.5)
Fraction of members who 45.8 39.7 45.2 6.1***
have relative in group (27.1) (28.6) (27.3) (2.3)
Fraction separated of husband 9.6 11.8 9.9 -2.2***
(9.7) (11.3) (9.9) (0.8)
Mean number of children 3.0 3.1 3.0 -0.1*
(0.83) (0.87) (0.83) (0.07)
Number of members 14.7 14.6 14.7 0.1
(3.9) (3.9) (3.9) (0.3)
Number of other SHGs in the village 5.6 3.2 5.4 2.4***
(4.5) (3.7) (4.5) (0.4)
Village caste fragmentation 0.44 0.39 0.43 0.05***
(0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.02)
Fraction of village households 64.9 62.1 64.6 2.8
with member who can read/write (21.1) (23.0) (21.3) (1.8)
Distance to the bank 6.6 7.5 6.7 -0.9*
(5.6) (5.1) (5.6) (0.5)
The table reports means (standard deviations in parentheses) of the indicated variable in the two sam-
ples and in the whole sample.
The asterisks indicate the statistical signicance of the dierence in the means across the two samples. *
signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%
21Table 11: Characteristics of present and past members
Present Past All Dierence
Number of women (%) 23,531 (87.7) 3,292 (12.3) 26,823 (100.0)
Average duration (years) 4.1 2.0 3.8 2.1***
(3.1) (2.1) (3.1) (0.06)
Caste ST (%) 33.7 41.1 34.6 -7.4***
(47.3) (49.2) (47.6) (0.9)
Caste SC (%) 18.7 20.7 18.9 -2.0***
(39.0) (40.5) (39.2) (0.7)
Caste OBC (%) 45.0 36.0 44.0 9.0***
(49.8) (48.0) (49.6) (0.9)
Caste FC (%) 2.6 2.2 2.5 0.4
(15.8) (14.6) (15.6) (0.3)
Fraction of members with same caste 77.8 73.1 77.2 4.7***
(26.9) (29.9) (27.4) (0.5)
Land (acres) 1.5 1.5 1.5 -0.02
(2.8) (2.9) (2.8) (0.05)
Landless (%) 18.9 25.4 19.7 -6.5***
(39.2) (43.6) (39.8) (0.7)
Education (years) 1.7 1.7 1.7 0.08
(3.3) (3.3) (3.3) (0.06)
Age 37.3 37.2 37.3 0.1
(10.6) (11.6) (10.7) (0.2)
Relative in group (%) 44.8 30.2 43.0 14.6***
(49.7) (45.9) (49.5) (0.9)
Separated of husband (%) 9.7 10.0 9.7 -0.3
(29.6) (30.0) (29.6) (0.6)
Number of children 3.1 2.7 3.0 0.4***
(1.8) (1.8) (1.8) (0.03)
The table reports means (standard deviations in parentheses) of the indicated variable in the two samples
and in the whole sample.
The asterisks indicate the statistical signicance of the dierence in the means across the two samples. * signicant
at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%
22Table 12: Characteristics of members by caste
ST SC OBC FC
Number of women (%) 9,276 (34.6) 5,068 (18.9) 11,790 (44.0) 673 (2.5)
Land (acres) 1.9 0.7 1.5 1.8
(3.0) (1.6) (3.0) (3.0)
Landless (%) 18.0 34.3 14.9 18.9
(38.4) (47.5) (35.6) (39.2)
Education (years) 1.6 1.2 1.9 3.8
(3.1) (2.8) (3.5) (4.2)
Age 36.7 37.6 37.7 38.0
(10.6) (10.9) (10.7) (11.0)
Relative in group (%) 43.0 44.2 42.5 44.4
(49.5) (49.7) (49.4) (49.7)
Separated of husband (%) 9.4 10.8 9.3 12.8
(29.2) (31.1) (29.1) (33.4)
Number of children 2.7 3.3 3.2 3.1
(1.7) (1.8) (1.8) (1.7)
Standard deviations are given in parentheses.
234.2 Survival analysis: empirical methods
Many of the more standard regression techniques that are used in economic analysis are not
appropriate to the questions that we are interested in. We would like to estimate the causal
eect of particular covariates on the time until events occur; in our case, the events being
either group dissolution or member exit. In a linear regression, the residuals are assumed to
be distributed normally. However, the distribution of time to an event is typically asymmetric
and may have dierent modes, which makes the use of linear regressions inappropriate.15 We
therefore use parametric and semi-parametric survival analyses. Semiparametric modeling
does not require a distributional assumption, as it exclusively uses the ordering of the survival
times, but is inecient as compared to parametric modeling.16
We begin with some standard denitions of functions. Denote by the nonnegative ran-
dom variable T, the time until the event of interest. In our context, this is the time until
the dissolution of the group or until a member departs in the member level analysis. The
distribution of T can be represented in several ways. The survival function ST(t) gives the
probability of surviving beyond a time t or, in other words, the probability that the random
variable T  t. The hazard rate hT(t) reects the chance of experiencing the event in the next
instant in time. For a continuous random variable T with a probability density function f(t),
we have S(t) =
R 1





We will estimate the hazard function using parametric and semiparametric methods. A
variety of dierent parametric models is available. We use the Weibull model for reasons that
are made clear below. For the semiparametric analysis, the Cox regression model is used.17
4.2.1 Semiparametric methods: The Cox proportional hazards model
The Cox model asserts that the hazard rate for the jth person in the data is given by:
h(tjxj) = h0(t)exp(xjx)
where the regression coecients, x, are to be estimated from the data. The baseline hazard
h0(t), which provides an estimate of the hazard rate for a group/member with a zero value
15The discussion in this section is based on Klein and Moeschberger (2003); and Cleves et al. (2008).
16The method is called semiparametric, because as far as time is concerned, it is nonparametric, but it still
parameterizes the eect of the covariate, so there exists a parametric component to the analysis.
17Nonparametric estimators are also a possibility, especially when dealing with a homogeneous population
because of the exibility they oer. Though our population is far from homogeneous, some results using
nonparametric estimates are given in our previous work (Baland et al., 2008).
24for all covariates, is given no particular parameterization and can be left unestimated. The
model makes no assumption about the shape of the hazard over time, except that it is identical
for all individuals. The main advantage is that we do not need to make assumptions about
h0(t). The cost is a loss in eciency. In the tables, we report the exponentiated coecients,
which represent the change in the ratio of the hazards for a 1 unit change in the corresponding
covariate. A hazard ratio of 1 therefore implies that the covariate has no eect on the risk of
failure. exp(j) < 1 implies that the covariate increases the time until the event occurs.
4.2.2 Parametric methods: The Weibull Model
The parametric model we use is based on the Weibull distribution. The hazard function in its
proportional hazard (PH) representation is given by
h(tjxj) = h0(t)exp(xjx) (1)
= t
 1 exp(0 + xjx)
In this model, the baseline hazard rate h0(t) is restricted to vary monotonically over time, but
it can be either increasing, decreasing or constant, depending on the value of the parameter
. If  = 1 this model reduces to an exponential model which has a constant hazard rate, if
 > 1, the hazard rates are increasing and if  < 1, they are decreasing. As we discuss in the
appendix (Section 7.2), the Weibull model ts well our data. One particular test compares
the estimated coecients, ^ x, with those from a Cox model. In the appendix, we report the
results obtained using the Cox model, which prove to be very similar.
4.3 Group duration
In our sample, 163 out of 1,637 groups became inactive and are no longer operating. This
represents a gross failure rate of 10%. For the analysis of group duration, we analyze group
survival as a function of a number of group characteristics. Caste composition is investigated
in various ways: (1) whether the group is homogenous or not, (2) the proportion of dierent
castes in the group, (3) the caste fragmentation index of the group, (4) whether the group
is homogenous in each particular caste separately, using homogenous scheduled tribe groups
as a baseline. For the members' characteristics, we measure the eect of the members' mean
education level, the average land owned by members, the fraction of members who are landless,
the average age of the members, the proportion of members who have a family relation in the
group, the fraction of members who are widows, divorced or separated, and the members'
25average number of children. We also control for the size of the group. At the village level,
we control for the number of other SHGs in the village, the village caste fragmentation index,
the fraction of village households having a member who can read and write, the distance to
the nearest bank, as well as block xed eects. Blocks are administrative divisions, which
comprise 8 to 10 villages. Our survey covers 5 blocks in Orissa, 4 in Chhattisgarh and 3 in
Jharkhand.
The hazard ratios from estimating the Weibull model for the group survival are presented
in Table 13. On average, the caste composition of the group does not appear as a signicant
determinant of group survival. Interestingly, however, groups composed exclusively of other
backward castes, and, for the scheduled tribes and scheduled castes, heterogenous groups,
present higher chances of survival. In other words, while other backward caste groups tend
in general to survive longer, for scheduled tribes and scheduled castes, group survival is more
likely if other castes are also present in the group. For the latter, the increase in the probability
of survival is equal to 35%.18
Turning to the other members' characteristics, the education level of the group and family
relationships in the groups both have a strong positive and robust impact on group survival.
On average, an additional year of education of all group members increases the chances of
survival by about 20%. Compared to a situation where no member has another family member
in the group, having all members of the group being connected by a family relationship doubles
the chances of group survival. The optimal group size is 18 members and the presence of
other SHGs in the village signicantly reduces the chances of group failure. Other groups in
the village may help either through the sharing of information, through the emulation they
provide or by making it more likely that PRADAN professionals frequently visit them. We
have not looked directly at these particular mechanisms as yet, and these remain conjectures
based on anecdotal evidence. Finally, the proportion of landless members in the group may
be associated with lower chances of survival. Column (3) shows that a group composed
exclusively of landless members is twice more likely to become inactive than a group with no
such members. The results are quantitatively not dierent from the results using the Cox
proportional hazards model, which are given in the appendix (Section 7.3).
We also ran similar regressions on each caste separately. The results in terms of caste
composition are consistent with the ones above, but often non signicant. The results in terms
of members' characteristics are very robust, and fully in line with those discussed above.
18These probabilities are computed by subtracting the estimated coecient from 1.
26Table 13: Group Survival (Weibull model)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Homogenous SHG 1.3035
(0.2700)
Fraction of SC members 1.2266 1.2685
(0.4762) (0.4778)
Fraction of OBC members 0.5964 0.6305
(0.2056) (0.2108)






Homogenous SHG, SC 1.1133
(0.4240)
Homogenous SHG, OBC 0.4472**
(0.1580)
Homogenous SHG, FC 3.7988
(3.0994)
Mean education (years) 0.8086** 0.8103** 0.8120** 0.8111**
(0.0719) (0.0741) (0.0748) (0.0732)
Mean land (acres) 0.9717 0.9715 0.9694 0.9728
(0.0516) (0.0517) (0.0512) (0.0490)
Fraction of landless members 1.9216* 1.5604 1.5917 1.7355
(0.7510) (0.6540) (0.6653) (0.7016)
Average age 0.9598** 0.9626* 0.9626* 0.9612**
(0.0198) (0.0199) (0.0198) (0.0192)
Fraction of members who have 0.4507** 0.4280*** 0.4156*** 0.4155***
relative in group (0.1445) (0.1382) (0.1350) (0.1342)
Fraction separated of husband 2.7240 2.5273 2.6204 2.7960
(2.4033) (2.2229) (2.2987) (2.4427)
Mean number of children 0.7936 0.7711 0.7713 0.7726
(0.1440) (0.1379) (0.1377) (0.1377)
Number of members 0.5243*** 0.5048*** 0.5025*** 0.5106***
(0.0561) (0.0528) (0.0531) (0.0539)
Squared number of members 1.0179*** 1.0192*** 1.0194*** 1.0189***
(0.0037) (0.0036) (0.0037) (0.0037)
Number of other SHGs 0.8910*** 0.8937*** 0.8927*** 0.8903***
in the village (0.0273) (0.0267) (0.0267) (0.0271)
Village caste fragmentation 0.9445 0.7485 0.8001 0.8930
(0.5016) (0.4003) (0.4366) (0.4886)
Fraction of village households with 0.9011 0.8692 0.8763 0.8661
member who can read/write (0.3540) (0.3408) (0.3423) (0.3305)
Distance to the bank 0.9745* 0.9703** 0.9710** 0.9725*
(0.0139) (0.0142) (0.0141) (0.0144)
Block xed eects yes yes yes yes
N 1,632 1,632 1,632 1,632
 1.3520 1.3482 1.3480 1.3592
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
274.4 Member duration in groups
We now investigate the determinants of the duration of members in existing groups. In our
sample, out of the 26,817 members surveyed, 3,285 left an existing group, which represents
a departure rate of 12.3%. We rene the model described in (1) to a Weibull model with
shared frailty. A frailty is a latent random eect that enters multiplicatively on the hazard
function. We do so, as members j might be correlated within groups i because of some overall
group characteristic (a frailty) that is not being measured. Shared frailty models are the
survival-data analogue to random-eects models. The frailties are shared across groups of
observations, thus causing those observations within the same group to be correlated. If a
frailty  is assumed to be shared across groups i, the hazard function (1) becomes:
h(tijjxij;i) = ih(tijjxij)
The frailties are assumed to have a gamma distribution with mean 1 and variance , to be
estimated from data. When  = 0, the model simply reduces to the standard Weibull model.
In the regressions that follow, we reject the hypothesis that  = 0 and hence include a frailty.
The member characteristics considered parallel those used in the analysis of group duration
and include the caste of the member, her level of education, her landownership status, her age,
the existence of a family member in the group, her marital status and the number of children
she has. At the group level, we use similar controls as for the group duration. The results are
displayed in Table 14.
On average, across all members, other backward castes are less likely to leave groups as
compared to scheduled tribes. The homogeneity or the fragmentation of the group do not seem
to matter. More importantly however, having other members of the same caste matters a lot
in increasing a particular member's duration within the group. Landless members are more
likely to leave: being landless increases the probability of departure by about 15%. Finally,
members who are educated, separated, have children, and, most importantly, are connected
by family ties with another member of the group stay longer in groups. At the group level,
education is positively related to survival.
These estimations assume that all members are aected in the same way by the caste
composition of the group. To consider the eects of heterogeneity more carefully, we also ran
the same regression separately for each caste. The results are reported in Table 15.
The results point to a very interesting pattern: with the exception of the forward castes, a
member is much more likely to remain in the group if a large fraction of members of the same
caste are in the group. She is much less likely to stay if a large part of the group is composed
of members of another caste. This process is uniform across the three main caste groups. The
28Table 14: Member Survival (Weibull model with shared frailty)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Caste SC 1.0838 1.0796 0.9795 0.9606
(0.0752) (0.0747) (0.0793) (0.0645)
Caste OBC 0.9458 0.9428 0.8702** 0.8996*
(0.0549) (0.0546) (0.0579) (0.0497)
Caste FC 1.0500 1.0439 0.8694 0.7839*
(0.1565) (0.1551) (0.1496) (0.1151)
Homogenous SHG 0.9004
(0.0578)
Fraction of SC members 1.5287***
(0.2408)
Fraction of OBC members 1.4537***
(0.1923)




Fraction of members with same caste 0.4551***
(0.0361)
Education (years) 0.9716*** 0.9717*** 0.9729*** 0.9712***
(0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0069)
Land (acres) 1.0083 1.0083 1.0082 1.0082
(0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0075)
Landless 1.1536** 1.1538** 1.1613** 1.1309**
(0.0670) (0.0670) (0.0675) (0.0653)
Age 0.9156*** 0.9158*** 0.9157*** 0.9154***
(0.0081) (0.0081) (0.0081) (0.0082)
Squared age 1.0010*** 1.0010*** 1.0010*** 1.0010***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Relative in group 0.5363*** 0.5368*** 0.5374*** 0.5631***
(0.0243) (0.0243) (0.0243) (0.0256)
Separated of husband 0.8664** 0.8662** 0.8651** 0.8595**
(0.0564) (0.0564) (0.0564) (0.0561)
Number of children 0.9051*** 0.9051*** 0.9051*** 0.9030***
(0.0113) (0.0113) (0.0113) (0.0113)
Mean education (years) 0.9494** 0.9480** 0.9178*** 0.9485**
(0.0231) (0.0231) (0.0242) (0.0231)
Mean land (acres) 0.9931 0.9939 0.9968 0.9967
(0.0209) (0.0210) (0.0211) (0.0212)
Fraction of landless members 1.0670 1.0542 0.9873 1.0189
(0.1624) (0.1606) (0.1540) (0.1555)
Fraction of members who have relative in group 0.8893 0.9070 0.8683 0.9225
(0.1017) (0.1043) (0.1011) (0.1059)
Fraction separated of husband 1.3116 1.2834 1.2969 1.2563
(0.4028) (0.3945) (0.3986) (0.3882)
Mean number of children 1.0259 1.0297 1.0344 1.0344
(0.0540) (0.0543) (0.0544) (0.0548)
Block xed eects yes yes yes yes
N 26,597 26,597 26,597 26,597
 0.8500 0.8496 0.8510 0.8504
Standard errors are given in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Other group controls are average age, total number of members and squared total number of members.
Other village controls are the number of PRADAN SHGs in the village, the distance to the bank, the
village caste fragmentation and the fraction of households having an adult member who can read and
write.
29Table 15: Member survival by caste (Weibull model with shared frailty)
(ST) (SC) (OBC) (FC)
Fraction of ST members 0.3036***
(0.0542)
Fraction of SC members 0.5093***
(0.1004)
Fraction of OBC members 0.4761***
(0.0763)
Fraction of FC members 0.5140
(0.3486)
Education (years) 0.9624*** 1.0100 0.9740** 0.8897***
(0.0113) (0.0178) (0.0110) (0.0332)
Land (acres) 0.9986 1.0245 1.0263** 1.0277
(0.0111) (0.0276) (0.0123) (0.0761)
Landless 1.0862 1.1658 1.2284** 2.2372
(0.1032) (0.1457) (0.1269) (1.1112)
Age 0.9034*** 0.9233*** 0.9250*** 0.8191***
(0.0126) (0.0187) (0.0140) (0.0585)
Squared age 1.0012*** 1.0009*** 1.0008*** 1.0022***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0008)
Relative in group 0.5414*** 0.5122*** 0.6150*** 0.3908***
(0.0408) (0.0512) (0.0459) (0.1244)
Separated of husband 0.6931*** 1.0910 1.0362 0.2470**
(0.0766) (0.1503) (0.1110) (0.1374)
Number of children 0.8908*** 0.9034*** 0.9243*** 0.8236**
(0.0171) (0.0248) (0.0205) (0.0769)
Mean education (years) 0.9173** 0.9077* 0.9441 1.3171**
(0.0354) (0.0523) (0.0350) (0.1689)
Mean land (acres) 1.0476 1.0041 0.9486 0.8183
(0.0332) (0.0666) (0.0327) (0.1061)
Fraction of landless members 1.3451 0.7486 0.9183 0.1869*
(0.3181) (0.2224) (0.2181) (0.1650)
Average age 0.9942 1.0136 1.0064 1.0812*
(0.0103) (0.0145) (0.0108) (0.0452)
Fraction of members who have relative in group 0.8316 1.3946 0.9311 0.5894
(0.1359) (0.3477) (0.1682) (0.3786)
Fraction separated of husband 1.5893 0.9004 1.0214 18.0224*
(0.6897) (0.5578) (0.4737) (30.3446)
Mean number of children 1.2052** 0.9679 0.9111 0.9507
(0.0933) (0.1058) (0.0738) (0.3388)
Number of members 0.7071*** 0.7201*** 0.8441** 0.8270
(0.0510) (0.0688) (0.0586) (0.2213)
Squared number of members 1.0069*** 1.0051 1.0000 1.0018
(0.0026) (0.0032) (0.0023) (0.0087)
Block xed eects yes yes yes yes
N 9,140 5,049 11,722 673
 0.8100 0.8580 0.9163 1.0876
Standard errors are given in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Other village controls are the number of PRADAN SHGs in the village, the distance to the bank, the
village caste fragmentation and the fraction of households having an adult member who can read and
write. 30magnitude of the eect is not negligible: an increase by 10% of the proportion of members of
one's own caste in the group increases the chances of survival by about 5% ((1-0.50)*10%).
We ran several alternative estimates, using a quadratic specication in the proportion of each
caste, or the proportion of members of the other castes, with very similar results.
5 Group and members performance
5.1 Descriptive statistics about group and members performance
In this section, we focus on the performance of the group and of the members. The basic
measure of this performance is the ability of the group and its members to have access to
bank loans. Being `linked' to a bank and obtaining a bank loan is indeed the major motive
behind the creation of those groups. Table 16 summarizes this information at the group and
at the member level.
Table 16 suggests a number of interesting patterns.19 In terms of castes, it appears that
while scheduled tribes, scheduled castes and other backward castes have a similar access to
bank loans, forward castes members are much more likely to obtain a bank loan, and the
amounts they receive are also much larger. By contrast, landownership does not seem related
to the probability of obtaining a bank loan. The amounts received by landless members are
higher than those received by members who own some land and less than those received by
members who own more than one acre. But it is remarkable that landless scheduled tribes
receive more than wealthier scheduled tribes.
In the Tables 17 and 18, we present the descriptive statistics on the characteristics of groups
and members, conditional on receiving a bank loan. On average, groups that are heterogenous
in terms of castes and which operated for a longer time are more likely to receive a bank loan.
In terms of the other characteristics however, groups are very similar.
From Table 18, we see that scheduled tribe members and landless women are more likely
to receive part of the bank loan, while the opposite holds true for the other backward castes.
Educated members are also more likely to receive a bank loan, as well as members with
relatives in the group. In Figure 6 we visualize the relation between the average bank loan
amount received per year and the land owned by the member's household. Although landless
women are more likely to receive part of the bank loan, it seems they do not receive more
than members who own more land.
19The gures presented are potentially misleading as we are averaging over groups and members of dierent
duration, as well as over groups that became inactive and groups that are still active.
31Table 16: Performance of groups and members in bank loans
Number of Proportion with Amount of the bank Share of the bank loan
observations at least one loans received per received, if the group
bank linkage year, if received received a bank loan
GROUP LEVEL 1,637 68.5 1,271 N.A.
MEMBER LEVEL:
Scheduled tribes 9,278 69.3 1,240 7.1
Scheduled castes 5,069 71.0 1,126 6.5
Other backward castes 11,795 70.7 1,227 6.4
Forward castes 673 76.7 1,838 7.5
Landless 5,266 72.2 1,261 7.1
0 < acre  1 12,864 70.1 1,136 6.2
1 < acre  2 3,996 72.7 1,299 6.6
> 2 acres 4,600 67.4 1,407 7.5
Scheduled tribes:
Landless 1,661 72.8 1,303 7.4
0 < acre  1 3,701 68.9 1,266 6.9
1 < acre  2 1,748 69.6 1,148 6.7
> 2 acres 2,134 66.9 1,226 7.5
Scheduled castes:
Landless 1,732 70.0 1,101 6.6
0 < acre  1 2,614 71.2 1,066 6.2
1 < acre  2 375 75.5 1,290 7.3
> 2 acres 334 71.0 1,625 7.8
Other backward castes:
Landless 1,746 73.0 1,313 7.0
0 < acre  1 6,231 70.4 1,085 5.9
1 < acre  2 1,800 74.7 1,360 6.5
> 2 acres 1,976 66.4 1,500 7.4
Forward castes:
Landless 127 81.1 2,133 10.2
0 < acre  1 318 71.7 1,395 6.0
1 < acre  2 72 87.5 2,768 6.4
> 2 acres 156 78.2 1,998 9.0
32Table 17: Group characteristics depending on whether the group received a bank loan or not
Did not receive Received All Dierence
Number of groups (%) 516 (31.5) 1,121 (68.5) 1,637 (100.0)
Average duration (years) 2.6 4.6 4.0 -2.0***
(2.5) (3.0) (3.0) (0.2)
Homogeneous group (%) 42.4 35.4 37.6 7.0***
(49.5) (47.8) (48.5) (2.6)
ST (% of homogeneous) 40.2 40.1 40.1 0.1
(49.1) (49.1) (49.0) (4.1)
SC (% of homogeneous) 18.3 17.6 17.9 0.7
(38.7) (38.2) (38.3) (3.2)
OBC (% of homogeneous) 41.1 40.8 40.9 0.3
(49.3) (49.2) (49.2) (4.1)
FC (% of homogeneous) 0.4 1.5 1.1 -1.1
(6.8) (12.2) (10.6) (0.9)
Caste fragmentation 0.20 0.24 0.23 -0.04***
(0.21) (0.22) (0.22) (0.01)
Mean land (acres) 1.6 1.5 1.5 0.1
(1.6) (2.0) (1.9) (0.1)
Fraction of landless members 19.3 21.4 20.7 -2.1
(26.3) (27.7) (27.3) (1.4)
Mean education (years) 1.8 1.8 1.8 0.004
(1.7) (1.7) (1.7) (0.09)
Average age 35.7 38.0 37.3 -2.3***
(5.4) (5.4) (5.5) (0.3)
Fraction of members who 45.2 45.7 45.5 -0.5
have relative in group (27.7) (26.7) (27.0) (1.4)
Fraction separated of husband 9.0 10.1 9.7 -1.1**
(9.6) (9.8) (9.8) (0.5)
Mean number of children 2.9 3.1 3.0 -0.2***
(0.86) (0.82) (0.83) (4.4)
Number of members 13.8 15.0 14.6 -1.2***
(3.8) (3.7) (3.8) (0.2)
Number of other SHGs in the village 4.6 5.7 5.4 -1.1***
(4.4) (4.5) (4.5) (0.24)
Village caste fragmentation 0.42 0.44 0.43 -0.02**
(0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.01)
Fraction of village households 63.7 65.0 64.6 -1.3
with member who can read/write (21.9) (21.0) (21.3) (1.1)
Distance to the bank 7.3 6.5 6.7 0.8***
(5.8) (5.4) (5.6) (0.3)
The table reports means (standard deviations in parentheses) of the indicated variable in the
two samples and in the whole sample.
The asterisks indicate the statistical signicance of the dierence in the means across the two samples.
* signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%
33Table 18: Member characteristics depending on whether the member received part of the bank
loan or not
Did not receive Received All Dierence
Number of women (%) 3,941 (25.2) 11,697 (74.8) 15,638 (100.0)
Average duration (years) 5.6 4.5 4.8 1.1***
(3.4) (3.0) (3.2) (0.06)
Caste ST (%) 16.6 37.5 32.2 -20.9***
(37.2) (48.4) (46.7) (0.8)
Caste SC (%) 19.7 19.4 19.5 0.3
(39.8) (39.5) (39.6) (0.7)
Caste OBC (%) 59.5 40.6 45.4 18.9***
(49.1) (49.1) (49.8) (0.9)
Caste FC (%) 4.2 2.5 2.9 1.7***
(20.1) (15.5) (16.8) (0.3)
Land (acres) 1.3 1.5 1.5 -0.2***
(2.6) (2.9) (2.9) (0.05)
Landless (%) 12.8 22.9 20.4 -10.1***
(33.4) (42.0) (40.3) (0.7)
Education (years) 1.3 1.7 1.6 -0.4***
(3.1) (3.2) (3.2) (0.06)
Age 38.0 38.4 38.3 -0.4
(11.0) (10.3) (10.5) (0.2)
Relative in group (%) 38.2 46.7 44.6 -8.5***
(48.6) (49.9) (49.7) (0.9)
Separated of husband (%) 10.8 10.0 10.2 0.8
(31.1) (30.1) (30.3) (0.6)
Number of children 3.3 3.1 3.2 0.2***
(1.8) (1.7) (1.8) (0.03)
The table reports means (standard deviations in parentheses) of the indicated variable
in the two samples and in the whole sample.
The asterisks indicate the statistical signicance of the dierence in the means across the two
samples. * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%
34Figure 6: Relation between average bank loan amount received per year and land owned
355.2 Group access to bank loans
We rst investigate performance at the group level, through various indicators. The rst
indicator is the amount of time the group had to wait till it received its rst bank loan. Given
the censored nature of the data, this indicator actually reects the probability that a group
with a given set of characteristics succeeds in obtaining a loan. We again use the Weibull
model of survival analysis, where the rst loan is the event considered. The results are given
in Table 19.
The results are particularly striking. In terms of castes, groups composed of other backward
castes and forward castes have to wait a shorter period of time before obtaining a rst loan.
Forward caste groups do exceptionally well when they are homogenous. By contrast, scheduled
tribes and scheduled castes groups perform better when they are heterogeneous, mixed with
members of higher castes. Although not reported here, the results obtained by carrying out
the analysis for each caste separately fully supports the above trends. The participation of
landless members in the group does not signicantly inuence the length of time spent before
obtaining the rst bank loan. Among the other factors of importance, groups with more
educated members and fewer separated women are also more successful. The presence of
other groups in the village also improves the performance of the group.
In Table 20 we turn to the number of bank loans received per year of activity, controlling
for whether the group is still active or not. Given the large number of groups that did not
receive a bank loan, we use a Tobit estimator. (Similar results were obtained when using a
Poisson or a simple OLS model.)
The results are very similar to the ones obtained in the duration model. In terms of castes,
scheduled tribes are much more successful when they are mixed with members of upper castes.
Scheduled castes and other backward castes perform in a similar way: they do better than
scheduled tribe groups and they benet from the presence of forward caste members in the
group. Forward caste groups perform very well, particularly when they are not mixed with
other castes. Landlessness does not seem to matter. The level of education of the members
and the presence of other SHGs in the village also improve the performance of the group.
Finally, we investigate the main measure of success, which is the amount of bank loans
received by the group per year of activity. We again use a Tobit estimator given the censored
nature of our data. The results are given in Table 21.
The results are in line with our previous discussion.20 The major factor behind the amounts
received by the group is the caste composition of the group. Again, the success of the groups is
20All these results also obtain when the analysis is carried out for each caste separately.
36Table 19: Duration till the rst bank loan at the group level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Homogenous SHG 0.9288
(0.0699)
Fraction of SC members 1.1444 1.1299
(0.1948) (0.1934)
Fraction of OBC members 1.5895*** 1.5786***
(0.2171) (0.2170)






Homogenous SHG, SC 1.0630
(0.1850)
Homogenous SHG, OBC 1.2302
(0.1801)
Homogenous SHG, FC 3.1093***
(1.1958)
Mean education (years) 1.1416*** 1.0847*** 1.0845*** 1.1245***
(0.0284) (0.0303) (0.0302) (0.0295)
Mean land (acres) 0.9660 0.9582 0.9593 0.9612
(0.0296) (0.0319) (0.0318) (0.0310)
Fraction of landless members 1.2650 1.3010 1.2855 1.2692
(0.2127) (0.2307) (0.2296) (0.2179)
Average age 0.9919 0.9877* 0.9876* 0.9908
(0.0074) (0.0073) (0.0074) (0.0074)
Fraction of members who have 1.0798 1.0338 1.0537 1.0822
relative in group (0.1425) (0.1373) (0.1410) (0.1430)
Fraction separated of husband 0.4865* 0.5065* 0.5051* 0.4905*
(0.1796) (0.1833) (0.1834) (0.1818)
Mean number of children 0.9437 0.9615 0.9615 0.9558
(0.0561) (0.0575) (0.0574) (0.0567)
Number of members 1.1444** 1.1785** 1.1768** 1.1459**
(0.0777) (0.0840) (0.0834) (0.0783)
Squared number of members 0.9974 0.9966 0.9966 0.9974
(0.0022) (0.0024) (0.0023) (0.0022)
Number of other SHGs 1.0250*** 1.0252*** 1.0258*** 1.0255***
in the village (0.0082) (0.0081) (0.0082) (0.0082)
Village caste fragmentation 1.3232 1.1664 1.1109 1.2490
(0.3220) (0.2775) (0.2694) (0.3094)
Fraction of village households with 1.0651 1.0320 1.0210 1.0702
member who can read/write (0.1967) (0.1888) (0.1878) (0.1974)
Distance to the bank 0.9857** 0.9876* 0.9872** 0.9864**
(0.0065) (0.0063) (0.0063) (0.0064)
Block xed eects yes yes yes yes
N 1,629 1,629 1,629 1,629
 1.4736 1.4894 1.4901 1.4755
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 37Table 20: Number of bank loans received by the group per year of activity, Tobit model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Homogenous SHG -0.0386
(0.0260)
Fraction of SC members 0.1122** 0.1060*
(0.0551) (0.0552)
Fraction of OBC members 0.1085** 0.1039**
(0.0471) (0.0473)






Homogenous SHG, SC 0.0779
(0.0595)
Homogenous SHG, OBC 0.0488
(0.0505)
Homogenous SHG, FC 0.3862**
(0.1691)
Mean education (years) 0.0219** 0.0093 0.0094 0.0176*
(0.0097) (0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0101)
Mean land (acres) -0.0119 -0.0122 -0.0119 -0.0124
(0.0094) (0.0091) (0.0091) (0.0096)
Fraction of landless members 0.0039 -0.0092 -0.0152 -0.0050
(0.0574) (0.0592) (0.0595) (0.0584)
Average age 0.0085*** 0.0073*** 0.0074*** 0.0080***
(0.0028) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027)
Fraction of members who have 0.0321 0.0150 0.0218 0.0285
relative in group (0.0454) (0.0458) (0.0463) (0.0460)
Fraction separated of husband -0.1846 -0.1726 -0.1760 -0.1842
(0.1290) (0.1284) (0.1284) (0.1287)
Mean number of children 0.0381* 0.0361* 0.0367* 0.0412*
(0.0213) (0.0211) (0.0211) (0.0212)
Number of members 0.0621*** 0.0662*** 0.0660*** 0.0623***
(0.0204) (0.0207) (0.0206) (0.0204)
Squared number of members -0.0014** -0.0015** -0.0015** -0.0014**
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Group is inactive -0.3604*** -0.3609*** -0.3594*** -0.3643***
(0.0516) (0.0519) (0.0519) (0.0514)
Number of other SHGs 0.0108*** 0.0109*** 0.0110*** 0.0113***
in the village (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0028)
Village caste fragmentation 0.0062 -0.0350 -0.0490 -0.0248
(0.0825) (0.0829) (0.0848) (0.0832)
Fraction of village households with 0.0094 0.0014 0.0000 0.0119
member who can read/write (0.0578) (0.0577) (0.0578) (0.0580)
Distance to the bank -0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0006
(0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0022)
Constant -1.1239*** -1.2148*** -1.2137*** -1.1985***
(0.2033) (0.2077) (0.2073) (0.2065)
(0.0150) (0.0151) (0.0151) (0.0151)
N 1,632 1,632 1,632 1,632
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
38Table 21: Amounts of bank loans received per year by the group, Tobit model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Homogenous SHG -164.8498*
(91.4462)
Fraction of SC members 598.0332*** 560.8242***
(188.3008) (191.1290)
Fraction of OBC members 500.0334*** 471.9919***
(164.6996) (166.4300)






Homogenous SHG, SC 458.4725**
(214.8200)
Homogenous SHG, OBC 198.5611
(166.7899)
Homogenous SHG, FC 1311.0451**
(649.7645)
Mean education (years) 95.5852*** 35.7783 36.7363 80.9507**
(31.9266) (34.9711) (34.9090) (32.9018)
Mean land (acres) -33.6116 -34.2132 -32.3912 -34.0337
(27.5910) (26.0045) (26.1477) (27.9901)
Fraction of landless members -12.1045 -98.4304 -135.7251 -73.7196
(207.3230) (210.0731) (209.2287) (207.6248)
Average age 39.9911*** 34.0329*** 34.1396*** 38.1508***
(9.3361) (9.0952) (9.1043) (9.1955)
Fraction of members who have 227.3131 142.8203 184.5654 198.1368
relative in group (149.1223) (147.1196) (150.1628) (150.1988)
Fraction separated of husband -407.6730 -361.6835 -381.3139 -406.4597
(431.1474) (429.4332) (429.8677) (430.9286)
Mean number of children 187.8205** 178.9368** 182.2968** 197.9122***
(75.5665) (73.9996) (73.7853) (75.1876)
Number of members 108.8919 127.0271 125.7229 108.2595
(80.1276) (79.9353) (79.3854) (79.6460)
Squared number of members -2.3780 -2.6947 -2.7250 -2.2404
(2.5253) (2.5220) (2.5028) (2.5093)
Group is inactive -1259.2223*** -1264.1927*** -1254.6398*** -1278.0025***
(147.7536) (147.9766) (147.5177) (146.0210)
Number of other SHGs 33.8960*** 34.5716*** 34.9621*** 35.9535***
in the village (9.5053) (9.3702) (9.3504) (9.4919)
Village caste fragmentation -20.8144 -259.1736 -345.3124 -168.3731
(280.3353) (269.9247) (278.2989) (276.4474)
Fraction of village households with 28.8481 -7.7145 -16.7497 37.7161
member who can read/write (198.8639) (198.1195) (198.3193) (198.4949)
Distance to the bank 0.4310 0.7953 0.6777 0.6506
(7.4643) (7.5274) (7.5131) (7.4607)
Constant -3572.0448*** -3976.3775*** -3966.3479*** -3907.8669***
(751.2166) (754.4013) (750.5695) (763.0711)
(67.7777) (67.6129) (67.4154) (67.8678)
N 1,632 1,632 1,632 1,632
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
39strongly related to the proportion of upper caste members. The best performance is achieved
by groups composed exclusively of forward castes. Lower caste groups, and particularly sched-
uled tribes, perform much better when they are heterogeneous. Again, the fraction of landless
members does not aect the performance of the group. Finally, the average education of
the members and the presence of other SHGs in the village are also positively related to the
amounts of the bank loans received by the groups.
5.3 Members' access to bank loans
In the following, we focus on groups that have received at least one bank loan, and investigate
how these bank loans are distributed across members.21 We shall focus on four measures:
an indicator variable measuring whether the member received a positive amount of the loan
or not, the share a member obtains in all the bank loans taken by the group (controlling
for the member's duration within the group), the share she obtains in the amount per year
received by the group (we also run this regression for permanent members only, i.e. members
who belonged to the group from the start till the day of our survey) and nally the amount
she obtained per year. In all estimations, we use a group xed eect, so that we eectively
measure, within the group, how the loan is distributed across its members as a function of
their characteristics. We use ordinary least squares in all the regressions. For the indicator
variable, we do this because we use a group xed eect, for the analysis of the shares, we do
this because a share of zero really means that the member received nothing, so that our data
is not eectively censored. The results are given in Table 22.
On average, with the possible exception of forward castes, the caste of the member does not
seem to matter for her access to the bank loans within the group. Similarly, the landownership
status does not matter. More educated members receive a larger fraction of the bank loans,
and the eect is potentially important, as 5 more years of education (which corresponds to
the completion of primary school), increases the share of the member by about 2 percentage
points, which corresponds to a 30% increase in a member's average share, and the amount
received per year by about 370 Rs. Separated women receive on average 1 percentage point
less than the share of other members in the group.
Groups collect savings from their members, and provide loans out of the group funds to
their members. We collected information on these loans, focusing on the last year of activity
of the group, but the information collected is imprecise, as we do not know the length of the
21The members considered in the regressions belonged to the group at the moment of the rst bank loan,
so members who left before the rst bank loan and who joined after are not included.
40Table 22: Member's access to bank loans (share)
Received a Share of the Share of the bank Share of the bank Amount received of
bank loan total bank loans loans received per loans received per the total bank loans
or not of the group year by the group year by the group per year of the group
(permanent members)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Caste SC -0.0064 -0.0015 -0.0012 -0.0010 -25.6875
(0.0144) (0.0028) (0.0030) (0.0030) (74.9572)
Caste OBC -0.0110 0.0016 0.0017 0.0011 26.3326
(0.0111) (0.0020) (0.0022) (0.0020) (69.8413)
Caste FC -0.0360 0.0140* 0.0145* 0.0149 311.0472
(0.0245) (0.0081) (0.0082) (0.0093) (287.9331)
Education (years) 0.0077*** 0.0039*** 0.0040*** 0.0037*** 73.4188***
(0.0011) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (8.3697)
Land (acres) -0.0013 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 19.5759**
(0.0012) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (9.2743)
Landless -0.0136 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0008 -0.4285
(0.0097) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0023) (46.7659)
Age 0.0097*** 0.0016*** 0.0016*** 0.0013*** 27.1407***
(0.0018) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (7.4620)
Squared age -0.0001*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000** -0.2739***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0833)
Relative in group 0.0187*** 0.0009 0.0005 0.0013 34.6912
(0.0068) (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0017) (31.2900)
Separated of husband -0.0315*** -0.0097*** -0.0098*** -0.0098*** -159.9224***
(0.0093) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0022) (35.7948)
Number of children 0.0098*** 0.0020*** 0.0019*** 0.0019*** 36.4246***
(0.0018) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (9.9242)
Duration in the group 0.0107***
(0.0010)
Constant 0.5010*** -0.1020*** -0.0496*** -0.0443*** 346.0803**
(0.0383) (0.0092) (0.0090) (0.0095) (174.6867)
Group xed eects yes yes yes yes yes
N 15,604 15,604 15,604 13,593 15,604
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
41loan and a large fraction of members took several loans over that period. We ran similar
regressions to the ones above on the amounts of such loans given to members. The results
suggest that upper castes members on average receive larger amounts, as do members who are
better educated.
6 Concluding comments
In this paper, we provided an empirical analysis of the performance of micronance groups,
known as Self-Help groups, based on an original census we carried out in a poor area of
Northern India. Given the pro-poor orientation of the program, the main question explored
in this paper was whether traditionally disadvantaged groups, such as lower castes villagers
or landless farmers, were less likely to have access to the groups and their benets.
The coverage of the program across villages is extensive, as about 42% of the households in
the village have at least one member participating in a group. Within villages, we did not nd
evidence of a bias in membership based on caste identity. On average in our sample, scheduled
tribes are less likely to be a member of a group, but this is solely due to a placement bias,
whereby groups are more likely to be created in villages with less tribes. We however nd
that the groups are much more socially homogenous than the villages where they are created,
suggesting a process of fragmentation of groups within villages based on caste identity. In
terms of landownership, membership strongly favors landless villagers, who are two times
more likely to enter a group than others.
We showed that exclusionary processes against lower castes and landless individuals are
mostly operating in terms of the higher probability of group failure and member's departure.
In particular, lower castes villagers are much more likely to belong to groups which fail and
disappear: the probability of group failure for a scheduled tribe or scheduled caste member
is twice as large as for a member of another caste. Moreover, their probability of leaving the
group is also substantially larger. The survival analysis carried out at the level of the groups
and at the level of the members highlighted an interesting trade-o in the process. While, at
the group level, having members of other castes in the group signicantly increases the chances
of survival of the group (by about 35%), at the individual level, it increases the chances of
departure by low caste members. In terms of landownership, groups composed of landless
members are more likely to fail, and landless members are also more likely to leave the group
(by about 15%) compared to other landownership categories. Their initial advantage in terms
of participation gets therefore partially eroded in the process.
We also analyzed the performance of groups and members in terms of access to bank loans,
42which is the major objective of these groups. We again nd that lower castes groups, and par-
ticularly scheduled tribes, perform much better when they are heterogeneous. At the member
level, however, we nd no evidence of dierences within the group. In terms of landownership,
we nd that, on average, group and member performance does not depend on landlessness.
This suggests that, once a villager remains a member of a group, and given the performance of
the group, caste identity and landownership do not play a role in beneting from group activ-
ities. Overall, we nd evidence that members of lower caste groups have a lower probability of
becoming a permanent member of a group. The net eects in terms of their expected access
to a bank loan remain however relatively limited. By contrast, even though landless farmers
are more likely to fail or leave the groups, they tend to benet disproportionately from the
existence of SHGs. In expected terms, they receive more than two times the amounts of bank
loans given to farmers owning more than one acre. Overall, the program therefore has positive
and important distributional implications.
These ndings are summarized in Table 23, where we report the amount of bank loans
that a given villager can expect every year, by caste and landownership category.22
22As we cannot use information on groups that received a bank loan, but for which the bank loan distribution
is missing (Section 2.3), the numbers do not fully match those of the Tables 8 and 16 above. The number of
observations in column (1) includes all households in the village (both with and without an SHG member).
Column (2) does no longer represent the probability of entering and remaining in an existing group, but the
probability of entering and remaining till the group received a bank loan or till the day we conducted our
survey. The numbers displayed in the table are simple averages, and therefore ignore the temporal aspect of
the process whereby groups in the early times of their creation have to wait several months before qualifying
for a linkage. Given the interval of time used for the observations, the amount of the bank loans received are
therefore under-estimated.
43Table 23: Expected amount of bank loans per year per caste and land category
Number of Probability of Probability Amount of Expected Signicance of
observations entering and of having bank loans amount of the dierence
remaining till at least one received bank loans relative to
group received bank linkage per year, received the baseline
bank loan or if received per year category
till day of survey
Scheduled tribes 18,955 34.4 67.6 1,269 295 N.A.
(47.5) (46.8) (1,893) (1,058)
Scheduled castes 8,506 45.9 67.9 1,153 359 64***
(49.8) (46.7) (1,811) (1,143) (14.2)
Other backward castes 22,654 39.9 68.5 1,178 322 27**
(49.0) (46.4) (2,033) (1,186) (11.1)
Forward castes 1,507 37.4 75.0 1,624 455 160***
(48.4) (43.4) (2,581) (1,547) (29.5)
Landless 6,136 65.0 70.3 1,260 575 N.A.
(47.7) (45.7) (1,656) (1,283)
0 < acre  1 21,058 45.5 68.0 1,120 346 -229***
(49.8) (46.7) (1,914) (1,184) (17.5)
1 < acre  2 11,186 26.8 70.5 1,311 247 -328***
(44.3) (45.6) (1,961) (994) (17.6)
> 2 acres 13,093 26.0 65.2 1,363 231 -344***
(43.9) (47.6) (2,431) (1,125) (18.2)
Standard deviations are given in parentheses. In the last column standard errors are given. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The analysis also highlighted the major role played by education in the performance of the
groups and its members. An increase in the average education of the members by one year
reduces the probability of group failure by 20%, and increases its chances of obtaining a bank
loan by about 12%. For a particular member, completing the 5 years of primary education
as compared to no education increases her chances of remaining in the group by 15%, and
her share in the bank loans obtained by the group by 2 percentage points (which represents a
30% increase compared to a member with no education). Education thus plays a pivotal role























457.2 The appropriateness of the Weibull Model
Several methods are available to judge the appropriateness of a particular parametric model.
As mentioned in Section 4.2.2, one possibility is to compare the results using the Weibull
model with the results of the Cox proportional hazards model.23
Another possibility is a graphical test. In the Weibull model, the natural log of the cumu-
lative hazard function, which is the accumulation of the hazard rates over time, is linear as a
function of the log of the time till the event. We plot these two variables in Figure 8.24 The
model seems to t the data very well except for groups with short durations and members
with short durations within groups.
Figure 8: Appropriateness of the Weibull model
7.3 Robustness check: the Cox proportional hazards model
23This is possible only because the Weibull model has a proportional hazard representation, what is not the
case for all parametric models.
24For more details, see Klein and Moeschberger (2003), chapter 10; and Baland et al. (2008).
46Table 24: Group survival using Cox proportional hazards model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Homogenous SHG 1.2802
(0.2650)
Fraction of SC members 1.1795 1.2162
(0.4549) (0.4555)
Fraction of OBC members 0.5897 0.6180
(0.2017) (0.2053)






Homogenous SHG, SC 1.0955
(0.4116)
Homogenous SHG, OBC 0.4365**
(0.1564)
Homogenous SHG, FC 4.3692*
(3.6234)
Mean education (years) 0.8106** 0.8087** 0.8104** 0.8099**
(0.0719) (0.0732) (0.0740) (0.0722)
Mean land (acres) 0.9744 0.9744 0.9726 0.9772
(0.0506) (0.0513) (0.0509) (0.0483)
Fraction of landless members 1.8962* 1.5486 1.5755 1.7058
(0.7472) (0.6528) (0.6639) (0.6932)
Average age 0.9580** 0.9603* 0.9604* 0.9588**
(0.0201) (0.0202) (0.0200) (0.0194)
Fraction of members who have 0.4597** 0.4331*** 0.4230*** 0.4187***
relative in group (0.1470) (0.1400) (0.1375) (0.1355)
Fraction separated of husband 2.4876 2.2920 2.3590 2.5440
(2.2065) (2.0307) (2.0874) (2.2338)
Mean number of children 0.7881 0.7629 0.7632 0.7605
(0.1423) (0.1358) (0.1357) (0.1351)
Number of members 0.5253*** 0.5046*** 0.5028*** 0.5122***
(0.0562) (0.0523) (0.0528) (0.0540)
Squared number of members 1.0179*** 1.0192*** 1.0194*** 1.0188***
(0.0037) (0.0036) (0.0037) (0.0037)
Number of other SHGs 0.8926*** 0.8945*** 0.8936*** 0.8912***
in the village (0.0268) (0.0264) (0.0263) (0.0268)
Village caste fragmentation 0.9725 0.7846 0.8296 0.9208
(0.5160) (0.4193) (0.4529) (0.5018)
Fraction of village households with 0.9179 0.8797 0.8860 0.8817
member who can read/write (0.3613) (0.3452) (0.3466) (0.3369)
Distance to the bank 0.9737* 0.9697** 0.9702** 0.9716*
(0.0139) (0.0142) (0.0141) (0.0144)
Block xed eects yes yes yes yes
N 1,632 1,632 1,632 1,632
 1.3520 1.3482 1.3480 1.3592
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
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